Presented at Roundtable Methodology Workshop on Religion, Conflict and Democracy in Northern Nigeria, organized by Centre for Peace Initiative and Development (CPID), Jos, held at Nevilla Hotel, Kaduna, 12th November 2011.
Muslim Religious Extremism, Radicalization and Militancy in Northern Nigeria
Prof. Abdalla Uba Adamu
Department of Mass Communications
Bayero University, Kano – Nigeria
(Vice-Chancellor of the National
Open University of Nigeria)
auadamu@yahoo.com
Introduction
While studiously avoiding overt
reference to ‘terrorism’, nevertheless debates about ‘radicalization and militancy’ inevitably conjure up the specters
of violence in politically Muslim
ideological context, particularly when using organized groups and strategies, as indeed characteristic of a military
(see for instance,
Black 2011, Vertigans 2009, Hollander 2008, Ayoob 2008, and Rubin 2003). Linking
such militancy with Islam, however
gives it the coloration of terror and use of violence. Of course
such radicalization and militancy is carried out within the organizational context
of Islamist movements. Such movements seeking
power today are faced with difficult
choices regarding strategy, ranging from armed struggle
to electoral efforts.
Since 1980 in northern Nigeria, the
emergence of what might eventually be placed
within the rubric of militant Islam has shifted the focus from a band of
albeit fundamentalists in the 1980s to a committed hardcore
Islamists with a clear political
– and violent – ideology in
the 2000s. This paper briefly traces the emergence of militant orthodox Islam1 in northern Nigeria
Dissidence in Islam and Antecedent to Political Islam
The history of Islam is replete with
groups who for either social or political reasons, prefer to follow a different path from that followed by the
main Sunni orthodoxy of Islamic faith.
For the most part, such dissidence, it could be argued, was not rooted
in fundamental questioning
of the validity of Islam as a religion, but on its instruments of implementation. In one of the early
disputes about leadership in Islam after the
death of the Prophet Muhammad, Ali, who became
the fourth Caliph
(after Abubakar, Umar and Usman) had his authority
challenged by Syrians leading to a series of
battles. The two armies met at Siffin in early 657, where Mu’awiya,
leading the Syrians, called for an
arbitration. The arbitration solved nothing, but it did serve to delegitimize Ali in the eyes of some of
his supporters, who deserted Ali's army and withdrew
to Nahrawan, east of the Tigris, thus earning the name Kharijites, literally “those
who went out” or more figuratively “those
who rebelled.” (Kenny 2006: 22).
Based
on their rejection of the criteria
for mediation established in the document, they took as their
slogan: “There is no judgment but Allah’s” (la
hukm illa li-llah). The initial
band of protesters retreated to a site called Harura’, where they were later joined by other defectors. The men among this force,
which had separated
itself from ‘Ali’s troops, were variously referred to
as Muhakkima because of their slogan or Haruriyya because
of their first
camp. The more generic name by which
they were to be
known. They have three fundamental credos. First, any believer who is beyond reproach
could become a Caliph, no matter how he traces
his lineage; and if his
actions do not conform to the Qur’an,
he can be deposed. Second, faith in Islam should
be validated with proper action and belief – a mortal sin is akin to leaving Islam altogether. Third, all Muslims are
equal, regardless of their race – a doctrine
that makes entry into Kharijism attractive for non-Arabs
who had to bear the brunt of condescending
racism of Arabs, especially in racially mixed areas such as Tunisia, Mauritania, Algeria, and Libya.
The Kharijites most significant strategy, however, is their resistance to authority – as witnessed in the assassination of Caliph Ali in 661 by one of them. While the original Kharijites rooted their rebellion
in a political (and indeed military) process,
nevertheless the fundamental structure of their rebellion relied on
their belief in la hukm illa li-llah. This perhaps explains
why differing views emerged as to the motive of their formation. R.E. Brunnow in his 1884 doctoral dissertation, and the first major European
treatise on Kharijites, perceived them as being politically motivated. Julius Wellhausen, on the other
hand suggests that the Kharijites were motivated by spiritual zeal which was strong enough for them to
break away from the main Muslim community
and form their own clustered identity. The belief that judgment lies with Allah implied a strict orthodox
interpretation of both knowledge and its attributes – unless it can be acceptable to Allah, then it is false judgment
or false knowledge: a credo the
Islamist group, Yusufiyya movement in northern Nigeria were to adopt in 2006.
Modern Islamism and Radical Islam
Of the few Muslim
intellectuals who by 20th century
would bring to fore the modernist
debates about political Islam, Syed Abul A'ala Mawdudi
(1903-1979) from Pakistan stood out. He also founded one
of the few precursors to modern political Islamic
organizations, Jamaat-e-Islami (the
Islamic revivalist party) in 1941. This became
very influential in crystallizing the idea of political Islam within a Western frame of intellectual thought, albeit retaining
a core principle of Islamism
– that Islam is more than a
religion: it is a political system; and that Muslims must strive to maintain the purity of Islam through the
enforcement of Shari’a which is to replace the secular
State. This has remained the central mantra
of such radicals
wherever they establish themselves. Closely connected
to Islamism is the issue of ‘radicalism’. As
Patel (2007: 42) argues,
Islamic
political radicalism in the last half-century has followed a tight pattern as a
direct response to mainly US foreign
policies, stretching from the installation and the support of the Shah of Iran in 1953, which led to the
Islamic Iranian revolution, to the US backing of the brutal Sudanese regime of Jafaar Nimeiry leading to a coup by a
radical Islamist military in 1989. The US involvement in Lebanon, with the aid of Israel
as a proxy, led to the demise
of a fragile coalition in the country and ushered in radical
elements, which until today remain unsettled. The US in the former Soviet republics
like Tajikistan has even allied with communists in order to counter the growth of Islamic movements.
Subsequently, according to Demant (2006) Islamism spread rapidly in the wake of the 1991
Gulf War, then became a threat of global proportions with the Algerian civil war, Hamas in the Palestinian territories,
the wars of Bosnia and Chechnya, the Taliban
in Afghanistan, al-Qaeda’s international terrorism, and the rise of Islamist parties and movements in Pakistan,
Indonesia, the Central Asian Republics of the
former Soviet Union,
and elsewhere.
Islamism, as political discourse and
action that attempts to center Islam within the political order (Roy 1994; Sayyid 1997), has been a conspicuous
phenomenon in different parts of the Muslim world, mainly since the eruption
of the Iranian revolution in
1979. As Antony Black (2011: 306) notes, ‘Islamism is a specific reaction to modern social and economic conditions, rapid urbanization, the dislocation of traditional communities and crafts, unemployment and anomie.’ Cast in this mold, attaching political dominance to Islam
therefore provides an alternative to Muslims
living under such conditions of what they perceive as moral decay or
political subjugation. By resorting
to Islamism, Islamists are advocating for a return to basics of Islam and shunning away the materialism of present secular
culture.
A fundamental credo of Islamist
philosophy is rejection of the ‘West’ and its values, since such West is seen as a threat to Islam in all aspects.
A second credo is obligation to Jihad (effort, struggle) in taking up arms against those
deemed to be unbelievers; however, this would seem to be a last resort as other methods
– persuasion, ballot
box
– would have to be explored first.
Within this context, there literally hundreds of Islamist resistance groups that advocate various forms of
radical social structures based on
Islam. Most of these Islamist groups base their radicalism on perceived injustice from the larger secular (or even
religious) civil society from which they operate.
The Iranian Revolution of 1979 and the
events of September 11, 2001 however, merely accelerated the cause of Islamism; but did not initiate it. Prior to these events,
Islamism had been manifest in various forms through various groups,
centered principally in the
Middle East – but sharing the same philosophy of ascendency of Political
Islam. These groups
are divided into two: the first are those restricted within particular territories and countries; while the second are those that are more transnational in their operation. The
first included, for instance, Fateh,
literally ‘opening’, which refers to PLO (Palestinian National Liberation Movement), founded in 1954 by members
of the Palestinian diaspora – principally refugees
from Palestine who were professionals working in the
Gulf states. Yasir Arafat was one of its founders. Hamas [Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyyah, or Islamic Resistance Movement] was formed
in 1987 in Gaza, Palestine, by members of the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood in response to the Israeli
occupation of Gaza.
It has formed the vanguard
of Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation since the second
Palestinian Intifada (popular resistance). Hezbollah, literally
the ‘Party of God’ (from Qur’an, Al- Mujadala,
58:22) emerged in 1982 as a Shi’a resistance fighting
the Israeli invasion
of south Lebanon.
Eventually, however, the scales turned from animosity towards
US policies in supporting
unpopular regimes to internal fissures that see the emergence of demands for reforms along Islamic lines within
the country. For instance, according to Salhi
(2011: 37) in Somalia, Al Shahab (The Youth), an armed Islamist group,
called for the establishment of a Shariah state (i.e., a state governed
by Islam), proclaimed jihad against
unbelievers, and urged nationalist resistance against
foreign forces, speficially the African Union (AU), the United Nations,
Ethiopia, and, more recently, Uganda.
In South Africa,
the Al Jama-ah was
established and registered on April 20, 2007 as a political party for South African Muslim
youth, with the conscious intent to capture the votes of young Muslims. However,
its
…objectives were far beyond
capturing the Muslim vote. It aims to introduce Sharia
in South Africa, making it the first South
African political party to declare explicitly this intention (Salih 2009: 195).
In some case studies, the emergence of
Islamist militancy is rooted both in political
culture as well as rights violations. In Algeria, a process of political liberalization took an unexpected
turn in 1990-91, when a newly created Islamic party, the Islamic Salvation Front or FIS (Front Islamique du Salut), took the lead
in the local and parliamentary
elections. A more dramatic political U-turn took place in early 1992 when the army supported a constitutional coup to prevent
the Islamic fundamentalists from forming a new government. This military intervention gave
the signal for a popular
insurrection by the pro-Islamic sections of the population that had contributed to the electoral
victory of the FIS. (Volpi
2003). As a prelude, it lead to massive civil
disobedience between 1992-1999. As Volpi (2003:
vii) further stated:
Political
violence began with the arbitrary arrests and torture of pro-Islamic
demonstrators by the army and the
police, and with the revenge killings of civil servants by Islamic guerrillas. Later, these violent tactics were used
against people who were not directly involved in the struggle for political power. At first the Islamic guerrillas
waged a spectacular campaign of assassination
and bombing directed at foreign nationals and assets in a desperate attempt to force foreign governments to drop their support
for the Algerian junta. By the mid-1990s the
use of terror had spread even to the most apolitical segments of the
rural population, as blood feuds,
struggles over land ownership and organised crime grew out of the confrontation between
the progovernment militias
and Islamic guerrilla groups.
The political situation deepened in the
face of increased police and army repression
on the members of the FIS, which was officially banned in February
1992. Increasingly, the actions of the repressive State apparatus created
a situation in which many political activists and ordinary
citizens had to reconsider their political views and practices, and form resistance Islamist guerrilla movements. The end product
was countless loss of lives
and property in the insurrection that followed, which in 1993 eventually lead to the formation of a coalition of various guerrilla
movements fighting the government into a single militia,
the GIA (Groupements Islamiques Armés, Armed Islamic Group) and gained its
notoriety by organizing a series of attacks against
civil servants and members of the government. The political strategy of the GIA was to extend the range of legitimate
guerrilla targets to politicians supporting the
provisional government, high-ranking civil servants and people working in the security
forces’ administrative departments. By its actions
the GIA sought to demonstrate the inability of the state to
protect its own supporters and collaborators.
The group used assassinations and bombings, including car bombs as its
modus operandi.
Islamic Scholastic Ascendancy in Kano
In order to provide a tapestry against which notions of radicalism might be understood within the historiography of Islam in northern Nigeria,
I will briefly look at the arrival
of Islam in Kano, and the subsequent emergence of different groups who
vary in methodologies from rhetorical to extremely violent.
This is not to connect the contemporary emergence
of Islamist groups in northern
Nigeria with historical events—indeed the current
situation in Nigeria
owes not to history, but to contemporary events—but I wish to provide
an overview of Islamic inflows and eddies in the region.
Kano became a sample state because of the existence
of credible
documentation detailing its local
history, rather than an ethnographic account by external researchers.
According to Tarikh Arbab (Palmer 1908) Islam was brought to the Hausa State of Kano in northern Nigeria by a caravan of
40 Wangara cleric merchants from Mali in about 1380 (East 1932).
The local chief,
Sarki Yaji (1349-1385) readily accepted the new
religion as a substitute to the old pagan practices of some of his people. He
also decried that Islam should be
adopted as a state religion in the Kano kingdom, and established an Islamic scholastic tradition in a particular area
of the city of Kano where the Wangara
cleric merchants settled. This settlement became known as the Madabo School, and became a university of
sorts with many north African scholars visiting the School-Mosque complex.
Thus sustaining the intellectual tradition
established by the Madabo school was a stream of visiting scholars
who came to Kano and who intensified the study Islam and
Arabic language, thus enriching the existing
higher educational base well established by the Wangarawa at the Madabo
school.
Thus the Wangarawa scholastic dynasty
left a legacy in the establishment of the first higher education centers in Kano all networked to the Madabo
schooling system. It was to this
school, which had established itself authoritatively in the fashion of its antecedent University of Sankore, that
scholars from all over Sudan flocked to study
Islamic theology in Kano. Notable among the eddy of scholars who
sojourned to medieval Kano and left intellectual legacies
included Ahmad b. Umar b. Aqit, who on his way to Timbuktu from the pilgrimage to Makkah taught in Kano for some time in late 1480s.
Another noted visiting
scholar to Kano was the Moroccan Abdul Rahman Suqan
b. Ali b. Ahmed al-Qasri
who was once a mufti of Fez. And in the first half of the
16th century, the Tunisian scholar, Shaikh al-Tunis came to Kano and taught. Similarly, Bornu and Aghirmi scholars were
also numerous in Kano (Chamberlain 1975: 60). Generally,
the educational system in Hausaland was framed along
the Timbuktu pattern
of learning in the fifteenth century...The method of education could be described
as “a master seeking method”,
i.e. it was largely
dependent on the teacher who offered the instruction, guidance
and prescribed text books for
an individual student until he perfected and mastered a particular branch of knowledge (Mohammed and Khan 1981: 131).
This
tradition was strengthened by the arrival
in Kano of Muhammad b. Abd al Karim al-Maghili, from Algeria, during the
reign of the Emir of Kano, Rumfa (1463-1499)
Rumfa was perceived
as the most radical and intellectual reformer
among the medieval Emirs of Kano, carrying, as he did, far reaching
reforms in all aspects of his administration. Rumfa according to Kano tradition, was also the most pious,
upright, dynamic, benevolent
ruler the Kano kingdom has ever had. As a dynamic visionary and foresighted king, the political
and administrative reforms
as well as the establishment of Kurmi Market are still
considered by Kanawa (people of Kano)
as second to none in the entire
political and economic
growth of the kingdom since that time.
Although Gwarzo (1975:70) was to claim
that when al-Maghili came to Kano “there was in existence some Islamic learning, but Islamic institutions had not been properly developed”, this is nevertheless not so.
Prior to al-Maghili’s arrival in Kano there existed extensive network of theological colleges and schools
under various mallams, all graduates of the faculties of the
Madabo school, established about fifty years
earlier with the arrival of the Malian Wangarawa scholars
in 1380.
Further, in a re-interpretation of the whole historical drama,
Barkindo (1988) suggests
that by the time when Al-Maghili arrived in Kano in about 1490, Rumfa
must have completed most of the his
reforms. It would appear, therefore, that al-Maghili’s presence in Kano served only as a catalyst towards accelerating
an already reformist process of
Rumfa. Perhaps the most eloquent testimony of al-Maghili’s intellectual influence on Rumfa was the former’s
treatises. Al-Maghili wrote the first Kano Emirate
constitution which was contained in Taj-al-din
fi ma yajibu ala‘l muluk and Wasiyyat al-Maghili ila Abi Abdullahi
Muhammad b. Yakub (Muhammad Rumfa), and translated as The Obligation of Princes by
T. H. Baldwin (1932).
The treatises, being wasiyyat concerning the obligation of
the prince (though more accurately, in this case, the Emir) to his subjects, followed
the Machiavellian framework of a “wise one” providing
over-the-shoulder religious guidance to a student on what was probably the first welfarist
state policy in The Sudan. Incidentally, it was actually
Rumfa who commissioned al-Maghili to write the books
for him — revealing a desire on the part of the ruling house Kano to
identify with classical Islam,
much in the same way one of Rumfa’s great-grandparents did with the Wangarawa clerics.
There was no doubt these constitutions written
by al-Maghili for Rumfa
provided the first recorded framework for the intellectual transformation of Kano on which subsequent Emirs of Kano built upon.
Thus
we can say that al-Maghili set out to remove innovations in the interpretation of Islam in
Kano and strengthened already existing scholastic institutions and established new ones. This was because his first acts, the appointment of an Imam for the Friday prayer,
and the qadi, were preceded by similar act of the Madabo Wangarawa faculty decades earlier.
Perhaps significantly, the Qadiriyya Sufi brotherhood—the first to be introduced in what was to become Nigeria later—was brought to Kano by Al-Maghili. As an informant
for Priscilla Starrat
(1993: 91) recorded:
The
Qadiriyya precede the Tijaniyya in this town, in this country of ours, Nigeria.
And, indeed, the one who brought the
Qadiriyya to this land of ours of Nigeria, the one who came with it was Shaikh Maghili. Shaikh
Maghili, indeed, he came with the Qadiriyya, about nine- hundred years ago, more or less.
The Qadiriyya was founded by
Abdul-Qadir Gilani (1077-1166) of Gilan, in Iran, although its scholastic roots were established in Baghdad.
However, although Al- Maghili was
credited to introducing Sufism in present day Nigeria, “it is more likely that the spread
of Sufi ideas in the Sahara and the Sudan was one aspect of the general
diffusion of Islamic culture spreading out from both North Africa and
Egypt at this time.” (Hiskett
1975:73).
Tijaniyya in the Sokoto Caliphate
Tijaniyya Sufi order was founded around
1781 by Sidi Ahmad al-Tijjani (1737-1815), who was
born in Algeria and died in Fez, Morocco. Tijaniyya reacted against the conservative, hierarchical Qadiriyya
brotherhood then dominant, focusing on social
reform and grass-roots Islamic revival. It was brought
to northern Nigeria
in the 19th century by Sheikh Umar Tall (also known as Umar al-Futi),
who, while on his way to the pilgrimage in Makkah from Futa Toro
in present day Senegal, stayed for some years
in the Sokoto, the then seat of the Caliphate of northern Nigeria. While in Sokoto, he was received by the Amir Muminin, Muhammad Bello, who was
the son
of Sheikh Usman Danfodiyo, the leader of the 1804 Jihad that united Muslim
northern Nigeria as a
singular Islamic caliphate. During his stay, Sheikh Umar initiated many people to the Tijaniyya brotherhood –
easily divorcing them from Qadiriyya which was the brotherhood followed
by both Sheikh Usman Danfodiyo
and his son Muhammad Bello. However,
while Tijaniyya gained mass audience in Sokoto, there was no evidence
to show that the leadership of the Caliphate
embraced the brotherhood, thus retaining their
affiliation to Qadiriyya. As Ousmane Kane (2003: 70-71) argued
To
acknowledge Muhammad Bello’s conversion, whether true or not, would require the Sokoto religious establishment to reject
the legacy of 'Abd al-Qadir Jilani, Usman Dan Fodio and Muhammad Bello, which was found unacceptable. As a result,
the politico-religious establishment of Sokoto hardened
their positions as qadiri and made the Qadiriyya
the official Sufi
order of the Sokoto Caliphate.
During a pilgrimage to Makkah, the Emir
of Kano, Abdullahi Bayero (d. 1954) met the
Senegalese Tijaniyya leader, Sheikh Ibrahim Niasse (1900-1975) who persuaded the Emir to accept Tijaniyya (abandoning
Qadiriyya). Sheikh Niasse was able to subsequently
visit Kano where he developed a massive following which lasts up to today with his posters and stickers
adoring walls of homes and public transport systems. This following became
subsequently referred to as Tijaniyya
Ibrahimiyya— to distinguish
it from Tijanniya Umariya of Umar Tall— and based its Sufi practices on extensive networks
of study centers
and zawiya (faculties) in almost every quarter of the city. These zawiyas became a
focus of Tijanniya Sufi recitations and chants
almost every evening. The spread of Tijaniyya Ibrahimiyya in Kano and subsequently northern Nigeria was facilitated by a
group of ulama known as Salgawa,
including Malam Tijani Usman Zangon
Barebari (d. 1970), Malam Abubakar Atiq (d. 1974), Malam Shehu Maihula (d. 1988), Malam Sani Kafinga (d. 1989) and
Malam Mudi Salga (b. 1932).
Initiation into the Tijanniya brotherhood was accompanied by the introduction of some special
characteristics: the initiation to tarbiya (spiritual training) and praying with one’s arms
crossed on the chest (qabd), in
contrast to the majority of local
Muslims who pray with their arms alongside their body (sadl) – a practice that
was become a focal point of confrontation between the followers of the two Sufi brotherhoods.
The Qadiriyya became more widespread
after the 1804 Jihad where both the leaders
of the Jihad as well as leaders
of the new emirates that emerged as a result of the Jihad all embraced Qadiriyya brotherhood. Kano
was the exception with the spectacular success
of Sheikh Niasse. Following this success and widespread acceptance of the Tijanniya, Sheikh Nasir Kabara
established his own brand of Qadiriyya as Qadiriyya Nasiriyya. Both the Sufi brotherhoods,
however, as Kane noted “were open to grass roots
participation, especially youth and women, which partly accounts for their success.”
(Kane 2003:72).
It is clear, therefore that entry into
the brotherhoods would have to be negotiated on the platform of youth. However,
the 1980s brought
newer transnational threats
to the Sufi brotherhoods in the form of Saudi Wahabism and Shi’a Islam.
Transnational Intrusion – Wahhabism vs. Sufi Groups
The writings of Muhammad ibn Hanbal
(780-855), the famous Muslim theologian who
declared war against the so-called intrusion of foreign influences in Islam inspired later generations of Muslim
thinkers, who became known as Neo-Hanbalis,
and condemned especially the Sufi orders, popular Islam and the cult of
saints. Notable among the latter Muslim thinkers
are Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328), Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziya (1292-1350), and Muhammad
Ibn 'Abd Al-Wahhab
(1703-1787). In Nigeria, one
of the most prominent disciplines of this critique of Sufism which later became known as Wahhabism was Sheikh
Abubakar Gumi (1922-1992) from Sokoto, although
based in Kaduna,
a strong pro-Saudi
cleric who used his position
as a leading national and
international Islamic scholar and cleric and prominence to promote the credo and generally condemn
Sufism and its practices. As Brian Larkin (2004: 98) pointed out
In
the early 1970s Gumi began to outline a critique of Sufism in a variety of
forums, from tafsir (Qur’anic exegesis) at the mosque, to newspaper articles, to
radio broadcasts. This critique
followed orthodox Wahhabi lines: he attacked Sufism as an innovation (bid’a) in Islamic practice in a religion where innovation in matters of
faith was not allowed; he criticized the veneration of Sufi saints
and the practice of Sufi orders. In its stead, he argued for a return to the key texts of Islam—the Koran and the
hadith—texts available to everyone through education and reason.
In 1972, Sheikh
Abubakar Gumi published an extremely anti-Sufi
book Al-'aqida al- sahiha bi muwafaqat al-shari'a (Bayrut,
Dar al-'arabi li al-tiba'a wa al-nashr wa al-
tawzi', 1972) in which he zealously set out to demonstrate the totally heterodox nature of Tijaniyya
and Qadiriyya. Concerning music used in the religious performances of the Sufi brotherhoods in Nigeria, Gumi wrote:
No
one denies the fact that reading the Qur’an, listening to sermons and praising
God are necessarily religious
deeds…But as for playing with musical instruments such as tambourines and drums over which the law is silent
on occasions such as of marriage ceremonies or
birthday parties of women and children, no one would oppose that if they
are done within the limits of
Shari’a…But those who combine drumming with religion or the recitation of the Qur’an and the praises of Allah in the
mosque , such people are considered as those who reduce their religion to a play thing and make thereby a mockery
of it. They therefore fall within the group of those the Qur’an refers to when it says [Qur’an 8:35], “Their prayers
at the sacred House are nothing but whistling and clapping of hands. They shall be punished for their unbelief.” (Gumi, in Loimeier 1997: 193)
Interestingly, even before Abubakar Gumi came out with this interpretation of the role
of music in religious performances, a noted preacher, Alhaji Lawan
Kalarawi, based in Kano had been a
thorn on the flesh of the Sufi brotherhoods in his consistent attacks on the use of bandir, especially by the Qadiriyya adherents in mosques, as well as their veneration of the Sufi
sheikhs. Lawan Kalarawi’s critique of Sufi practices—available
only from his cassette-recorded preaching and sold in Kano markets—however, were based on orthodoxy and was emic to the Hausa society—as contrasted with the transnational Wahhabism of Abubakar Gumi’s attacks on Sufism. And while Kalarawi appealed to the mass
audience to wean people away from Sufi practices, Gumi had more appeal to the intellectual class as represented by professionals, civil servants, students
and urban elites in northern
Nigeria. His transnational connections to the Saudi scholastic hierarchy accorded him a more
sophisticated platform on which to
attack Sufi brotherhoods on a more globalized
level than Kalarawi’s often bawdy—but thoroughly appreciated—sermons.
By 1978 a group of young Muslim Hausa
who supported Gumi’s anti-Sufi position had
coalesced to form Jama'at Izalat al-bid'a
wa iqamat al-sunna (Society for the Removal of Innovation and Reinstatement of the Tradition
(of the Prophet Muhammad) in
the city of Jos under the Chairmanship of Sheikh Isma’il Iris, and with Sheikh Abubakar Gumi as a Patron.
They subsequently became referred to as ‘Yan Izala,
and adopted a trenchant extremist Wahhabi position against
Sufism.
The
Izala set up a branch
in Kano under the leadership of Sheikh L. Suleiman in 1978. Setting
up a formal organization was one thing, however, but successfully calling
for reform—which, in the
case of the Izala, means abandoning Sufism—in Kano was quite another. The inhabitants of the Kano city were,
in general, deeply
attached to the Sufi
orders. Further, the Izala approach was a trenchant attack on Sufism and other social Hausa interpersonal behaviors (e.g.
genuflecting to parents and elders, an inherited Hausa
custom). As John Paden (2005:62) pointed out,
The tension between the Sufi
brotherhoods and the anti-innovation legalists (Izala) came down to the role of traditional culture in the definition
of Islamic identity. To some extent,
an increasing number of Nigerians felt more comfortable with the ethnoreligious traditions of their own
communities than the transethnic identities of
the Sufis or Izala.
There was a need for a West African rather
than an Arab model of Islam,
and it was clear that outside the Arab world, Muslim communities in Central, South, and Southeast Asia were making
efforts to keep the spirit
of Islam but allowing for variation in its cultural
forms.
The first attempts to carry out
open-air preaching advocating the “abandonment of local Islamic practices
and return to pristine Islam” (which included
labeling venerated saints
such as Ahmad al-Tijani and 'Abd al-Qadir
al-Jilani as infidels) were ruthlessly
suppressed. On May 27, 1980, while members of the local committee of Izala attempted to preach within the
walled city, they were attacked by partisans of the Sufi orders, and one preacher of the Izala died in the
clash. Following this incident, the Izala preachers tended to avoid open-air preaching
within the walled
city and to operate in the suburbs
outside the city wall (Kane 2003).
The Izala drew further inspiration from Gumi’s incessant
attacks on Sufi brotherhoods,
such that he encoded his apathy towards them in his widely circulated Hausa translation of the Qur’an with
commentary in 1992, and particularly his interpretation of Ayats 31 and 32 of Sarah Rum. The original Ayats stated:
Turn ye back in repentance to Him, and fear Him: establish regular
prayers, and be not ye among those who join gods with Allah, (Qur’an
31, Yusuf Ali Translation).
Those who split up their Religion, and become (mere)
Sects,- each party rejoicing in that which
is with itself!
(Qur’an 32, Yusuf Ali Translation).
In the Hausa
commentary on these two Ayats, Gumi interpreted “those who join gods with
Allah” in the following terms:
All the Sufi orders must be banned because
they divide people
into different sects.
The followers of a given Sufi order believe that the beliefs
and practices of the order to which they
are affiliated are better than that of the others.
Thus, they would not agree to meet the disciples
of another order at the time of the recitation of their litanies [wurdi in Hausa, wird in Arabic]. Moreover,
the wird and practices of the Sufi
orders include innovations contrary to Islam.
Gumi commentary on Qur’an 30: 31, 32; p. 882.
In other words, to Gumi, the Sufi
brotherhoods and their followers constitute a form of “mushrikeen”. It is therefore not surprising that clashes
occurred between the two groups.
Increasing Islamist Militancy against Authority – The
Maitatsine Phenomenon While the fires
of conflict between
the Sufi brotherhoods and the Izala were raging
in many cities in northern
Nigeria in the late 1970s,
another Islamist militant
group emerged; but with a difference. For while Sufi/Izala
clashes were essentially contained within the house of Islam, with both the two groups
holding a high degree of respect
for secular government and its constituted authority, the new group chose
to tread different
paths. They subsequently became labeled ‘Yan Tatsine, and were under the leadership of Muhammad Marwa, aka Maitatsine. They violently intruded into
the public sphere in December
1980 (for various
accounts, see Lavers
1984, Christelow 1985, Clarke
1987, Hiskett 1987,
Isichei 1987 and Skuratowicz 2004).
The name, Maitatsine, is derived from a Hausa phrase he commonly employed
against his detractors, Alla ya tsine maka
albarka, “May God deprive you of his blessing.” His followers were therefore known as the ’Yan Tatsine. Because
the group was intensely suspicious of outsiders, and because the disturbances gave rise to many wild rumors and apocryphal stories,
little reliable knowledge
exists of the movement or its leader.
Muhammadu Marwa was reportedly born in
the region of Marwa, a city in northern Cameroon, probably
in the 1920s. (A Nigerian
passport that he acquired gave the date
1927.) He is commonly thought
to have been Kirdi by origin, a member of one of the small hill peoples, followers of
indigenous religions, who inhabit the region, the plains of which have been dominated by Muslim Fulani since the
jihad of the early nineteenth century.
But there are also reports
that at least one of his parents
belonged to the Shuwa, an
Arabic-speaking group living in the region. In the 1920s and 1930s there was a large-scale emigration of
young Kirdi men from the hills to the plains,
driven by poverty and, in 1931, by a severe famine; the young Muhammadu
Marwa may have been among them. He
reportedly became the servant of a Muslim scholar who inspired his conversion to Islam. On that occasion, he took
his Muslim name, Muhammadu. He may
have been exposed to Mahdist ideas; in the 1890s this region had served as the base for the Mahdist
movement led by Haya bin Sa'id (d. 1899), a member of the Sokoto
royal family.
Muhammadu Marwa is said to have come to
Kano in 1945, but nothing is known of his activities there until the early 1960s.
By this time he had acquired a reputation for a particularly vitriolic form of tafsir, (Qur’anic commentary) which radically differed from the mainstream
Sunni commentaries in Kano and other parts of
northern Nigeria. His credo
seemed to have revolved around condemnation of any modern form of technology — from wearing watches,
to cars, bikes, television sets etc. His mechanism of showering curses
(Hau: tsinuwa) on any object
or group of people that took his fancy, especially the Sufi brotherhoods, earned him the sobriquet of Maitatsine — he who curses. He also denied
the teachings of the Prophet
Muhammad
and relied exclusively on the Qur’an as
the source of his faith, which he imparted to
his followers.
The political and religious life of
Kano in the years just after Nigeria's independence in 1960 was turbulent, and Muhammadu Marwa joined in the fray.
In 1962 Emir Muhammadu Sanusi
(ruled from 1953–1963) had him brought
before a Muslim
judge on charges of illegal
preaching and an offense known in the Arabic legal records as shatimah,
or abusive language.
The latter
offense was severely—and frequently—punished in Kano at the time, since the
exchange of insults by political or religious groups often led to violence. The judge gave Marwa a three-month prison
term, to be followed by deportation to his native Cameroon.
The Nigerian military takeover of 1966
brought an end to the formal powers of the emirs
and in general weakened traditional social controls. This change made it possible for Marwa to return to Kano in
the late 1960s. In 1971 he was issued a Nigerian passport
in order to perform the pilgrimage to Mecca.
By the late 1970s the petroleum boom had brought
a major new injection of wealth to Kano,
and with it came rapid social change. For many of the established residents of the city this meant accelerated incorporation
into the modern sector of Nigerian society,
especially through the state-run secular school system. At the same time, young men were drawn from the countryside
in increasing numbers. Many of them followed a traditional pattern
in the region, leaving their families to become Qur’anic
students (Hausa, almajirai) and supporting themselves and their teacher
through begging (Hausa,
bara) and casual
labor. The economic
and educational changes
of the 1970s made this group increasingly marginal. Such youth were
the main recruiting ground for the ’Yan Tatsine. Groups
affiliated with them sprang up in other towns in northern Nigeria
and developed their own separate
ritual centers.
Starting in 1977, the aggressive preaching of Marwa's disciples
and the growth of his community
of followers inspired vociferous public complaints. The approach of the turn of the Islamic century (fourteenth
century ah) in 1979, an event associated with
the arrival of a renewer
of the faith, apparently inspired
Marwa to announce
his claim to prophethood. In 1978, as Nigeria
returned to civilian rule, Kano state elected a governor from the People's Redemption Party, Abubakar Rimi. The Nigerian
presidency, however, was captured by this party's conservative rival in
northern politics, the National Party
of Nigeria. The distrust between the federal and state levels of government hampered efforts to control the ’Yan Tatsine.
On 26 November
1980, Governor Rimi issued an ultimatum demanding the dispersal of the large group of followers who had gathered
around Marwa's compound
in ’Yan Awaki Quarters, just outside the old
walled city. At this time, the arrival of Libyan troops in the Chadian capital of Ndjamena added to public
anxiety. Governor Rimi took no
immediate action on the expiration of the ultimatum. Rumors circulated that the ’Yan Tatsine planned to take over
the city's two main mosques at congregational
prayers on Friday, 19 December. The day before, however, a group of ’Yan
Tatsine entered into a violent confrontation with the police at Shahuci Field, near the emir's
palace. With bows and machetes, they
drove off the police, captured weapons, and burnt trucks.
Ten days of heavy fighting ensued in
which more than four thousand people were killed.
Many were victims of vigilante groups that sprang up around the city and attacked
anyone they suspected
of belonging to the ’Yan Tatsine. The Nigerian army finally
was called in to quell the disturbances. Marwa and his followers fled their stronghold on 29 December. Marwa himself
was killed in the process and some one thousand of his followers
arrested. In October
1982 violent disturbances linked to the ’Yan Tatsine
occurred in the city of Maiduguri in northeastern Nigeria.
Other disturbances followed
at Yola (March
1984) and Gombe (April 1985).
The ’Yan Tatsine movement follows a
pattern common in Muslim West Africa that may be termed “religious separatism,” Such groups
embrace heterodox practices
and esoteric interpretations
of the Qur'an (Christelow 1985). They emphasize their own purity
and refuse contact
with the rest of society.
Muhammadu Marwa was especially known for his condemnation of all modern
innovations from bicycles to radios and buttons.
He reportedly accepted only the Qur’an as a valid source of religious teaching, yet as a prophet claimed the
right to issue new religious injunctions, or at least new interpretations of the Qur’an. He had no known links
with other Islamic groups of either Sufi or Wahhabi
orientation. However, as Kastfelt (1989: 84) argued,
The
anti-authoritarian and unorthodox religious character of the Maitatsine
movement was combined with a strong
social and political radicalism, emphasized by its rejection of the authority of the Kano State government and
by the social composition of the Maitatsine followers, most of whom were recruited from among the urban poor of northern
Nigeria.
Thus while the Sufi/Izala movement
operated within the confines of constituted authority,
and can be considered emically, rather than etically violent, nevertheless their respect for authority provided a
limited check on the spread of their internal
violence.
The Yusufiyya Movement
— From Rhetoric to Islamism
The spiritual leader of the what later
became Yusufiyya movement was AbuYusuf Muhammad Yusuf (1970-2009), who resided in Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria.
He was a Tsangaya [Qur’anic
college] product and early enough in his preaching life, became heavily involved in Islamic youth activities. One of the
most prominent northern Nigerian
Islamic preachers in Maiduguri with a particular endearment by youth, was Sheikh Mahmud Jafaar, a
Saudi-trained scholar who intensified the activities
of existing Ahl-Sunna group—a loose term that refers to many interest groups within ultraorthodox Islam—and preached against innovations in Islam, which
included veneration of saints and Shi’ism. His style of preaching, full of rhetoric
and contemporary examples,
coupled with a relatively simple lifestyle, painted
a down-to- earth advocacy for Islam which made him
an instant star preacher. Yusuf and other teeming youth were attracted to his inner core group and Yusuf was eventually made the leader
of the youth wing of the group, Shababul
Islam [Islamic Youth Vanguard].
Extensive undercover reporting of the
genesis of the group by Abdulkareem Ogori, and reported
in The Politico (Nigeria, December 18, 2010), claimed that the Shababul
Islam in Maiduguri was soon populated by young, rich and well-educated
members who became influenced by the teachings
of radical UK-based
Islamic scholar, Sheikh
Abdullah al-Faisal (Ogori 2010),
originally Trevor William Forrest. Al-Faisal was born in 1964 in St. James, Jamaica, and emigrated to the UK in
1981, when he was about 17 and traveled
to Saudi Arabia where
he spent about eight years
before earning a degree and converting to Islam before
returning to the UK in 1989. According to BBC
News Profile on him, “Al-Faisal spent years travelling the UK preaching racial hatred urging his audience to kill Jews,
Hindus and Westerners. The imam called on impressionable
teenage boys to learn how to use rifles, fly planes and use missiles to kill "all unbelievers. In return for becoming martyrs,
he promised them the reward
of a place in paradise." (BBC 2007, online).
Apparently the Maiduguri youth who belonged
to Shababul Islam became fascinated by Al-Faisal’s teachings through access to his tapes, some of
which condemned the West and its
lifestyle and the Salafis [Wahhabis]—and that became a mantra of the Shababul Islam; a mantra to which Muhammad
Yusuf took up with great gusto—to the
consternation of his elders in the Ahl-Sunna main group, which included Sheik Jafaar. This in fact lead to their parting
of ways, with Yusuf leaving the Ahl-Sunna and
fully engaging in Shababul Islam activities, with a strong anti-Western
knowledge and lifestyle message.
This attracted a lot of more youths
to a mosque he set up within
Maiduguri metropolis.
From the analysis of his taped preaching, widely available in mosque markets
throughout northern Nigeria,
Muhammad Yusuf’s sermons
focused on the following:
1.
condemning the constitution of Nigeria, referring
it as “dagut” (idolatry)
2. condemning aspects of the conduct of modern western schooling
3. condemning anything that is related
to government and consider whoever
is in it as an infidel
4. accusing the Nigerian
government of not allowing them to practice
their religion
It is the persistent theme of condemning aspects of Western
schooling that earned
the group the sobriquet of
‘boko haram’ in the Nigerian media, an expression widely translated, very wrongly, as ‘Western education is sin.’ This is
because it is assumed that ‘boko’ –
an Hausa onomatopoetic of ‘book’ – means ‘Western education based on Western books’. Strictly, it does not.
This mistake is often made by scholars with
poor understanding of Hausa language, lack of content analysis of the
group’s statements, and overt
reliance on newspaper accounts of the groups’ activities. For instance
Abimbola Adesoji (2010:
100) states that:
“Boko
Haram” is derived from a combination of the Hausa word boko meaning “book” and the Arabic word haram which is something
forbidden, ungodly or sinful. Literally, it means “book is sinful”, but its deeper meaning is that Western
education is sinful, sacrilegious or ungodly and should therefore be forbidden.
The word ‘boko’, according to the most
authoritative lexicon of Hausa language has
11 meanings, all but one of which gravitate around
the first, which is: doing anything
to create impression that one is better off, or that t. is of better
quality or larger in amount than is
the case (Bargery 1934: 117). In other words, deception. The last meaning
(no 11) given to the word by Bargery is for ‘English
book’ – but the classical definition of ‘boko’ retained its original meaning, at least
in colonial period, of deception. Thus technically, ‘boko haram’ means ‘deceptive knowledge
which is
sinful’, not ‘Western education is
sin’. This is because charlatan marabouts—basing their epistemology on faulty interpretation of Islamic injunctions to deceive clients—
are also technically ‘yan boko’ (dispensers of deceptive knowledge). In
Kano and other core Hausa areas of
northern Nigeria, the expression ‘dan boko’ was used derisively to refer to anyone who puts in airs and graces of
pretense of being a socialite or a sophisticate.
And since those who go to Western schools usually had such airs and graces based on their assumed superior status as
potential government employees—thus guaranteeing job security—it became
natural to apply such term to such people.
However, according to the new
dictionary of the Hausa language published 2006 by the Center for the Study of Nigerian Languages, Bayero
University, Kano, Nigeria, the word
‘boko’ acquired semantic extension due to its usage to refer to Western knowledge, at least in one of the four
meanings in the dictionary. Subsequently, the
CSNL (2006: 50) came up with four meanings of the word:
boko (bookòo, sn., nj.)
(i) ilimin zamani.
(ii) rubutun Hausa da baƙaƙen
Romawa. (iii) giri. (iv) makirci…
[boko (bookòo,
sn., nj.) (i) modern
knowledge. (ii) Hausa
written in Latin
alphabet. (iii) deception, lying.
(iv) guile]…
Thus
Muhammad Yusuf’s lectures
and writing were geared precisely
towards convincing his
followers that knowledge inspired by Western ideas is false in some respects, but neither he, nor his followers
after his death,
ever actually proclaimed that such knowledge
is sinful. He thus used the word ‘boko’ in its original Hausa context to mean ‘false’. It is the process of
demonizing the movement that created the projected
medieval persona of the group as condemning Western education – a fact they found amusing, since they not only
use products of Western technology and knowledge
(laptops, arms, explosives), but at one stage they even had a full-blown website to proclaim their ideals. In
addition, their attack on Bauchi prison in August 2010 was facilitated by extensive use of Google Map which
helped them to map out the prison
location and its access roads,
and subsequently take strategic locations
that hampered counter attack
by security agents, as documented in their video release, Gazwatu Abi Ibrahim [Abi
Ibrahim’s War].2
Within seven years (1999-2006), Muhammad Yusuf succeeded in indoctrinating more than 2000 young people who either resigned from
their various working places or abandoned education at university or polytechnic level
and in several cases tore their certificates and embraced other
petty businesses, while accepting Muhammad Yusuf’s credo.3 Based on
this, the followers of Muhammad Yusuf became referred to often even amongst themselves) as Yusufiyya
[followers of Yusuf’s teachings]. However,
their formal tag for themselves was Ahl as-Sunnah
wa al-Jama’a ala Minhaj as-Salaf
[‘People of the Way of the Prophet
Muhammad and the Community (of Muslims), in line
with the earliest generation of Muslims’]. The Nigerian media, however, prefer the catchier ‘Boko Haram’ almost always
accompanied with a translation explaining the name to mean ‘Western education
is sin’.
In their organizational structure, the Commander
in Chief (Amir ul-Aam) is the leader
of the entire group. He has two deputies (Na’ib Amir ul-Aam I & II). Each State (where they exist) has its own Amir (Commander/Leader), and each Local Government Area also has an Amir. Below
the Local Government Amirs are
the
remaining followers. They also organized themselves according to various
roles, such as Soldiers and Police, etc.
Yusufiyya Epistemology
From the explicit contents of the
lectures and debates of their leaders and some of their preachers, and from their interpretation of the Qur’an and
Sunnah, they regard nonmembers to be kuffar (disbelievers; those who deny the truth) or fasiqun (wrong- doers).
Most
the accounts so far of Yusufiyya in Nigeria and in the international press
(itself based on ground
accounts in Nigerian press) tended to rely on the more esoteric aspect of their visibility – the violent
confrontations with constituted authority, especially the Police, and how such violence filtered
to the community.
None
of the accounts, so far, seemed to have paid attention to a textual
analysis of the views
of the members of the Yusufiyya movement themselves, particularly their founder and leader, Muhammad Yusuf, who
after his death in 2009 became referred to
as Imam Muhammad Yusuf by his followers – which seemed to have martyred him.
In this section I want to present the
actual philosophy of Yusufiyya – in their own
words, based on the transcript of a debate held between Muhammad Yusuf
of Yusufiyya, and the Imam of the Abubakar Tafawa
Balewa University of Technology, Bauchi, Malam Isa Aliyu Ibrahim Pantami,
as well as Imam Idris Abdul’Aziz of Bauchi.
The Pantami debate took place on Sunday 25th June 2006, as identified by the lead debater, Malam Pantami. The
Abdul’Aziz debate took place in February 2008.
In the first debate, the Pantami Debate4—which lasted for 02:48:51—the two scholars clearly displayed deep respect for each
other’s opinions, but ended on a stalemate, which
each defending his views. The overall purpose of the debate was to determine the acceptability of Western Education
and modern democratic institutions within an Islamicate culture.
Pantami lead the debate by usually
asking a probing question, and following the
answers given by Yusuf with another questions. The first series of
questions dealt with Yusuf’s
understanding of Western
Education:
Pantami: What is Mallam’s view on Western
Education; and indeed what does he understand to be Western
Education?
There
are three perspectives on knowledge in Islam. The first is knowledge which is
in line with what the Qur’an and the
Hadith (saying of the Prophet Muhammad) taught. Second, a perspective is where such knowledge clash
with what the Qur’an and the Hadith contain. The third is a neutral perspective – which neither clash nor support
Qur’an and the Hadith; for as the
Prophet (Muhammad) said in his hadith concerning People of the Book, “if they
bring to you anything that agreeable
in Qur’an, accept it; but if they bring anything that contradicts Islam, reject it; and if they bring
anything that neither contradict nor support the Qur’an, it is your choice to accept
or reject it.”
Well,
this is the perspective I accept – if any form of knowledge is to be pursued
for its sake, not following the
structure of any government form of education, then I have my own reservations – I thought
that is what the learned
colleague asked of me, right?
The debate then moved on to etymologies of education, specifically Western Education:
What is Western Education?
Western
Education is the body of knowledge that came to us through European
colonialists, and included
learning medicine, technology, Geography, Physics and so on. And of course the English
language itself. They can all be used if they do not clash with the teachings
of the Prophet Muhammad (may peace
and blessings of Allah be upon him), and we can teach these subjects to our own children in our
schools – so long as they do not contradict Islamic teachings. If they do, then we
should discard them.
In this statement Muhammad Yusuf has
more or less outlined his fundamental philosophy which is based on his Islamist core values – not accepting anything which, to him, does not have a place within the
knowledge framework of Islam. It is clear, therefore,
that he did not reject, out rightly, Western education, but has issues with certain aspects of information usually
taught in Western schools. Thus as the debate
continued – and became more heated – it became increasingly clear that the Yusufiyya
credo seemed to be against mainly scientific knowledge, as explained in the following dialogue:
What do you say about a student
who goes to Bayero (University) or University of Maiduguri to study Physics,
Geography, Chemistry and others
Following the current
educational structure we follow in Nigeria, it is haram (forbidden).
What about a student studying medicine with the hope of helping his
fellow Muslims, or to work in a government school or in a Radio station, is this haram in Nigeria
or not?
There
two aspects to this. One that is rooted in the necessary educational laws, and
other that governs community
services. Anything to do with the government is haram, although even in this,
there are different
perspectives from Islamic
scholars about this it being haram.
Why do you see it as haram. What examples can you give?
I am happy you asked this question. First there is a subject
they call Biology. This teaches people
the origins of man, and that man was not created from clay (as outlined in the
Qur’an Sura 23:12 which says: “Man We
did create from a quintessence (of clay).” It teaches that human beings had a separate origin from
this, and they evolved. So you see, in just one subject, I have given
an example of evolution.
In
Geography, they have a theory of revolution. In their understanding, the sun is
central to a group of ten planets
including the earth. They gave names to the planets
such as Mars, Jupiter, Uranus, Mercury and others. These names
were derived from Greek gods. This directly contradicts
what the Qur’an and Hadith stated, therefore studying this (Geography) is
haram, because of this contradiction.
In
Sociology they keep debating about the nature of Allah, the most high. In their
view, there is honest doubt as to
whether Allah exists or not; some teach that since they cannot physically see Allah, then He does not
exist.
Then there is something they call Geology5 in
which they have something they call Big Bang
Theory which teaches that Allah created the world in four millions years
and three minutes and one second – which directly
contradicts what Allah says in the Qur’an:
Your Guardian-Lord is Allah, Who created the heavens and the earth
in six days, and is firmly established on the throne (of
authority): He draweth the night as a veil o'er the day, each seeking the other in rapid succession: He created the sun, the moon, and the stars, (all) governed
by laws under His command.
Is it not His to create and to
govern? Blessed be Allah, the Cherisher
and Sustainer of the worlds! (Qur’an 7:54, Yusuf Ali translation).
And
then in the university course outlines in Geography, they have a course called
Time Scale, in which they explain how Allah created
the world in three million
years. This contradicts the verse in Surat
Fussilat of the Qur’an that says:
Say: Is it that ye deny Him Who created the earth in two Days? And do ye join equals with Him? He is the Lord of (all) the Worlds.. (Qur’an
41:9, Yusuf Ali translation)
In
Chemistry they have something called Energy – they claim that it is not
created, and it has no end. This is equating energy
with features of Allah most high, who is has no beginning
and no end.
Most learned
Sheikhs (that had gone by) had explained these. One of them was Sheikhul Islam
Ibn Taymiyya (may Allah agree with him), who in his book al-Furqan baina Awliya al- Rahman wa-Awliya al- Shaitan 6
explained that the mystics of Islam (Sufis) talked about Saints who in their thinking claim there is no veil (hijab)
between them and Allah, meaning they
claim to see Allah when they get into a state of spiritual ecstasy. This belief
is the same as believing in the
concept of Energy, because both deny the existence of Allah, and that He did not create
the world and all its contents.
Yusuf’s epistemology is therefore based
on Ibn Taymiyyah’s book, The Decisive Criterion between the Allies of the Merciful
and the Allies
of the Devil, and right away sets the stage for his non-compromising views on the role of secular epistemology in Islamicate social
structure.
When
it became clear that Yusuf was mixing his scientific facts up, Pantami
challenged him to prove the Islamic implausibility of the Theory of
Evolution7 – which Yusuf
seemed to have a particular issue with – using Yusuf’s own rule of engagement at the beginning
of the debate in which he stated that a form of knowledge could be acceptable to Muslims if it does not contradict the sayings in the Qur’an. Yusuf kept referring to Ibn
Taymiyyah’s book as his reference point – and
which Pantami asks him to point out exactly what Ibn Taymiyya
said about creation. At one point,
Pantami had to ask whether
Yusuf had been to at least primary
school – to which Yusuf
responded in the negative:
First, Mallam, and apologies for this question
is not asked without any ulterior motive,
have you ever attended a primary school
in your life?
No, I have not
You have not been to at least primary school,
so how can you explain
things you don’t
know The reason
is that Islam is clear on the things that contradict it; further I did not just
say these things are bad in Islam,
no, I studied them first through Ibn Taymiyya and what he says and that clearly show contradictions in some aspects
of Western form of knowledge.
Pantami then spent considerable time explaining how he uses the internet,
particularly Islamic da’awah
(propagation) websites such as www.islamtoday.com, as a depository for asking questions and
receiving answers on all aspects of Islam from
learned scholars who are acknowledged authorities in the field.
Consequently, the general consensus
of the Islamic scholars at Islamtoday wesbsite is that it is indeed expected
of Muslims not only to accept responsibilities in non-Muslim governments, but to also be very proactive in this, as their presence is
likely to reduce any possible damage that might be done to Muslims in general. Thus the general
consensus would
be that it is desirable for Muslims not
only associate with non-Muslims, but to also
acquire their form of knowledge.
Yusuf seemed to have got annoyed at
this, and chided Pantami by pointing out that
Pantami is not talking to himself and the need to refocus attention on
the debate at hand – the Islamic
viability of Western form of education and knowledge in its present structure in Nigeria. Yusuf then
proceeded to insist that the only arbiter in
deciding what is valuable knowledge to a Muslim is the Qur’an, not an
internet website or its contents.
In this, Yusuf actually uses the Kharijite template “There is no judgment but God’s” (la hukm illa li-llah). Thus if any form
of knowledge is not in the Qur’an or sanctioned by Ibn Taymiyyah, then it is haram (forbidden) to Yusuf and his
followers. Considerable time was spent even on the word “haram” itself and the distinction between what is merely not approved [bai halatta ba] and what is forbidden
(sinful, haram), with Pantami insisting
on differentiating between
an undesirable knowledge
(because it cannot be used) and harmful knowledge which is prohibited. It is easy to see why
Yusufiyya were seen as proclaiming that ‘Western knowledge is sin’, because in the Pantami debate, Yusuf stuck to
the word “haram”, as his
justification for shunning any form of knowledge not in the Qur’an – although he does accept other forms of knowledge that do not challenge
the very nature
of God.
However, Yusufiyya’s views were brought
clearly in another debate with Idris Abdul’Aziz, of Bauchi, and recorded in
February 2008. This was more heated and contrasted
sharply with sober Pantami Debate. The central core of this debate was to refute the participation of a Muslim in
any democratic government that is not based on
principles of Islamic Shari’a, but it also reinforced Yusuf’s views on Western schooling.
In answering the question of whether
boko is ‘haram or not’ Muhammad Yusuf provided
the same stock answer he gave in the Pantami Debate – about the three structured perspective of knowledge in
Islam: accept, reject, neutral; although in this particular debate he added the dimension of ‘kuffar’ [unbelief] if the form of knowledge in any way challenges any attribute of Allah. It is clear that he has refined
his arguments from the 2006 Pantami Debate.
In answering the question as to whether
boko is haram
or not, he stated that in the “current state of education
in Nigeria”,
…it
is haram, based on its structure because the content matter contradict the
oneness of Allah. It is haram because
they combine males and females in the same place. It is haram because
they honor Christian
days. It is haram because
they teach things
that question the very nature
of Allah.
Abdul’Aziz cuts him short by insisting
that he did not ask Yusuf to explain the circumstances
of acquisition of knowledge in contemporary educational systems in Nigeria; all he had asked was for Yusuf to
bring a quotation from the Qur’an, the Hadith
or other learned scholars [“ba fahimtar ka ba” – not your own understanding] that prove boko is haram
in Islam. Yusuf started by trying to provide a background to his
statement that boko is haram – and was cut short by AbdulAziz who still
insisted he was not interested in
structures of knowledge or division (although he promised they will discuss that eventually), but
for the purposes of definition of terms, so that they all on the same page, Yusuf should provide a single quote
from the Qur’an that made boko haram. Yusuf countered by stating that he needed
to provide a background
to his answer – and they kept on arguing.
Eventually, however, Yusuf provided the verse which Abdul’Aziz wanted
in the following dialogue:
Alright, here it is:
And
say to the believing women that they should lower their gaze and guard their modesty; that they should not display
their beauty and ornaments except what (must
ordinarily) appear thereof;
that they should
draw their veils
over their bosoms
and not display their beauty except to their husbands, their fathers,
their husband's fathers, their sons,
their husbands' sons, their brothers or their brothers' sons, or their sisters' sons, or their women, or the slaves whom
their right hands possess, or male servants free
of physical needs, or small children who have no sense of the shame of sex; and that they should not strike their feet
in order to draw attention to their hidden ornaments. And O ye Believers! turn ye all together towards
Allah, that ye may attain
Bliss. (Qur’an 24:31, Yusuf Ali translation).
This
ayat is clearly contradicted in their schools because boko schools enable
people to see each other’s
nakedness. Secondly, Allah, the most high has stated in the Qur’an:
He
Who has made everything which He has created most good: He began the creation
of man with (nothing more than) clay. (Qur’an 32:7, Yusuf Ali translation)
Yet they teach that man evolved.
This is shirk (retraction from Islam) and anyone who attends the schools will have to learn that. They also teach people
about the solar system – this is a lie,
and they are falsifying information on behalf of the creator.
These are the reasons why boko is haram.
O.K. let’s go back to the verse you quoted (Qur’an 32:7), do you have any reference
to any other scholar who uses this verse as a basis for making
boko haram?
If
that is the case, then let us establish boundaries of boko; you tell me what
you think it is, and I will give you my own
version.
What I understand with boko is modern knowledge which was brought to us
by British colonial administration; some of which is in conformity with Islam, and there are parts that
are not in conformity with Islam. There are in fact things
they included in boko which were borrowed
from Muslims. This is my understanding of boko.
Each
knowledge has three perspectives in Islam – one that is acceptable, one that is
not acceptable, and one that is neutral.
This is my understanding of Western knowledge.
But Mallam, if any form of knowledge has these three perspectives, can we
condemn it completely and call it haram? You did say it was haram, right?
Yes, I repeat, Boko is haram…
…cuts in….Yawwa [aha, that’s it!]
BUT
in the way they teach it. You should have asked me if they have various kinds,
then I could explain….
…cuts in… that’s what you said (boko haram), that’s
what you said
Yes, but the current structure of delivery in this country
makes it haram.
Did I say so or not?
You said it!
There you are then!
But are you saying the entire structure
is haram?
The structure of the West African Examinations Council Syllabus is haram
Consequently, to Muhammad Yusuf, any form of organized modern secular education is considered sinful in Islam because of its potentials in aiding immorality.
After
the Pantami Debate
in 2006, Muhammad
Yusuf released a book which
he wrote in Arabic. The title of the book is Hazihi Akeedatum wa Minhaju Da’awatuna (This is Our Manifesto and Our Path). The book is
out of print now. It contains about 300 pages
and was published in 2009. A counter argument to Yusuf’s views was also published
in Arabic in 2009 (Jalo 2009), while
earlier, another author
wrote what was prefaced
Yusuf’s ideas against Western knowledge in 2008 (Alkanawi, 2008)— although Yusuf’s book was actually a
second printing, and likely to have been published in 2008.
Yusuf’s book outlines the essential
features of Yusufiyya philosophy, based on the
fact that they had been garnering media attention at their sermons and
religious gatherings, particularly on Western knowledge, Shi’a, and participation in government
employment and elective process. From a close reading of the book, it would also appear Yusuf’s writing drew its
inspiration from two books of Ibn Taymiyyah
– Minhaj as-Sunnah an-Nabawiyyah [The
Pathway of as-Sunnah an- Nabawiyyah]
and al-Furqan baina Awliya al-Rahman
wa-Awliya al- Shaitan [The Decisive Criterion between the Allies
of the Merciful and the Allies of the Devil].
As stated in the section of
the book in a section dealing with ‘Dangers of Western Schooling’, he stated:
8
According
to Darwinism, human beings originated from a small animal which evolved over millions of years before becoming human.
Subhannallah! This is a big lie! Whereas Allah has detailed how He created human beings from dust and water. This
is our belief and on which we base our Islam.
The amazing aspects
of creation are stated in the Qur’an
in many places:
Ar-Rum 30:20:
Among His Signs in this, that He created you from dust; and then,- behold,
ye are men scattered (far and
wide)!
Al-An'am 6:2:
He it is created you from clay, and then decreed a stated term
(for you). And there is in His presence another
determined term; yet ye doubt within yourselves!
Al-Muminun 23:12
Man We did create
from a quintessence (of clay);
As-Sajda 32: 7-8
7.
He Who has made everything which He has created most good: He began the creation of man
with (nothing more than) clay,
8. And made his progeny
from a quintessence of the nature of a fluid
despised:
At-Tariq 86:5-6
5. Now let man but think from what he is created!
6. He is created from a drop emitted-
And
the Prophet said: Allah has created Angels from light, and He created Djinns
from fire, and He created Adam from
what has been aforementioned. So where do we place this truth of monotheistic narration, as compared to
the unbelief of this man, Darwinism [sic].(Yusuf, 2009: 89-90).
In another
passage dealing with democracy,
I am warning you about the troubles of our modern
times, especially on democracy, infidel,
modern idol to whom its followers worship. We will not accept, interact,
or partake in this democracy
because it is the path of infidels; following it, interacting with it and using
it is following the path of the
infidels. It is prohibited for any Muslim to be in it, or to elect an infidel
under the system
of democracy. (Yusuf
2009: 63).
Muhammad Yusuf’s preaching subsequently attracted the attention
of Nigerian security agencies over the years leading
to detentions, but he had always been released, often to a very tumultuous welcome from his followers in Maiduguri. Some
of the activities of the Yusufiyya movement
seemed targeted at taunting the authorities.
For instance, when the Borno State government introduced a new law insisting on motorcyclists to wear
crash-helmets, and implemented by a police task force, Operation Flush Out II, Muhammad Yusuf and his disciples refused
to abide by the
new law; and since they openly intimidated almost everyone else, they were left alone. And yet it is this singular
implementation of the law that triggered the violent confrontation in July 2009. Earlier, in June, some members of
the Muhammad Yusuf’s group conveyed
the corpse of one of them who died to the cemetery. On the way, they came across one of their
members being punished by Operation Flush operatives for contravening the crash helmet
law. They went to his rescue, and in the process
the security operatives fired sporadic shots and in the stampede many of the followers
were hit. This incidence raised
tension among his disciples.
On Thursday 11 June 2009, Muhammad
Yusuf released a video titled “Budaddiyar Wasika
ga Gwamnatin Tarayya” [Open Letter to the Federal Republic of Nigeria]. It was clear from the video that Muhammad
Yusuf had declared war on the Federal Republic—ironically not on the basis of Islamist tendency,
but on what he perceive
to be denial of his human
right to assembly. It was an open call to arms, and the members of the sect responded with gusto. As he stated in the video:9
We
have stopped listening to their saber-rattling. Our brothers do not hate you,
it is not because you are in PDP or in ANPP [main political
parties in Borno State, the home turf of the movement]
that they hate you. We did not do anything to them to make them hate us. They only hate us because we have faith in
Allah and because we do not accept government of democracy. They don’t hate us because we love Allah, no no, no,
only when he slights them. Why do
they not attack other citizens – only us who believe in Allah and His prophet.
Whose property have we ever
destroyed? Who is it we slaughtered like a ram? Who is it did we enter their houses and ransacked them? Just
because we Allah said, and the Prophet (Muhammad) said, then they detest us because of our turbans
– and yet this is not enough,
they have to shoot us with their guns. This is my explanation. We will no longer listen
to anyone (for mediation); their time is up. We will no longer
accept invitations for mediation from anyone. We will not accept the shooting of 20 of our members,
and we will not let it go, and we will not listen to anyone anymore. You gave the soldiers the orders to shoot us….
It is instructive that although Yusufiyya did not advocate
direct imposition of Shari’a at that stage – just a withdrawal from any system that does not conform
to Islam. Thus unlike
the Kharijites, they did not openly, at least in the preaching of Muhammad Yusuf, advocate for violent change of
government. However, the incidence in early June
2009 provided the trigger to move to the next level in extremism – from persuasion to confrontation; often as was widely reported,
with deadly consequences, including the killing
of Muhammad Yusuf at 39 years on 30th July 2009 in the hands
of Nigerian police who claimed in news
reports that he was killed attempting to escape.
From Debates to Violent Actions
The virtual destruction of the
Yusufiyya movement by the Nigeria security forces in July 2009 and the death of their leader, Muhammad Yusuf, drove
the movement underground for almost
six months. In 2010 they began a systematic insurgency against security forces—both the police and the army—as
well as those who collaborated with the security
forces leading either
to their capture,
or shooting. From
January 2010 to June 2011, they carried
out more than 20 documented attacks which included shootings, bombings, including suicide bombing.11
Their
most spectacular public re-emergence was on 7 September 2010 when a cell of the
group led a massive well-armed attack on Bauchi prison, freeing over 700 detained members of the movement. They distributed two leaflets to terrified residents
of the area. The first was on half A4 printer paper on which
the following was written: “Jama’atu Alhlissunnah lidda’awati wal
Jihad ba Boko Haram ba”, which means “Jama’atu Alhlissunnah lidda’awati wal Jihad [Followers of the Sunnah of the Prophet
[Muhammad] for Propagation [of Islam] and Jihad] not Boko Haram.”
This is the first time the group has articulated
its own nomenclature, since they have never referred themselves as Boko Haram.
The
second leaflet on full A4 paper, and titled ‘In Maye Ya Manta.’ [If the perpetrator has forgotten (the victim will not)], contained the first
articulation of their new militant insurgency stating, amongst others:
Everyone can attest to the fact that since we started
our activities about eight to nine years ago, we have never molested anyone. We only
preach that it is forbidden to follow any path
contrary to what Allah through his Messenger [Prophet Muhammad] commands
to follow. You are all witness to the
sudden attack on us in our mosque during the early dawn prayer by this oppressive government, shooting and
killing our members and arresting others. And yet there are, among our Muslims brothers, those who act as agents
of the government and point us out for the government forces to kill or arrest.
This serves as a general
notice to all: fighting this government is mandatory on everyone. Whoever
refuses this will be accountable to Allah. For us, we would rather die than fail
Allah on the account of our deeds. Whoever can, join us; if not, shut up, for it does not concern
you, leave us alone, and watch what will transpire.
The leaflet was signed ‘Jama’atu Alhlissunnah lidda’awati wal Jihad, which is waging
the Jihad in the country called Nigeria.’ JASLWJ thus formally declared
its Islamist agenda in August 2010, as well as launched
its name. This is because
prior to this, the group had been focused on proving its
epistemological stand on various aspects of knowledge
with various scholars. Thus assault on the group by the Nigerian security forces and the subsequent
state-sanctioned killings of their various members from July 2009 metamorphosed them into a hardcore militia, whose
modus operandi borrows heavily
from Al-Shabab of Somalia and GIA of Algeria, and centers around
fighting the Government with any means necessary. Interestingly, up to
that time, there was no clear ideological focus in the groups’ messages—either on tape or video. Their main grouse were two: killing
their leader and followers, and not being left
alone to preach
Islam in the way they understood it.
In January 2011 a new VideoCD surfaced
in northern Nigeria containing a direct address
by Yusuf’s second-in-command, Imam
Abu Muhammad Abubakar Bin Muhammad
Shekau, who had taken over the leadership of the movement. Indeed Muhammad Yusuf himself had anointed Shekau
as his successor in a phone-clip video interview recorded apparently by Nigerian security
forces after his capture few hours
before he died in July 2009. The new message declared a fresh war on the Nigerian
government, and also stated:
Muslim brethren, we did not make unlawful
anything except what Allah [and the Prophet]
has made unlawful.
We did not make lawful
except what Allah [and the Prophet] has made lawful.
This is what we have been saying. We rebel against western inspired
knowledge. We rebel against
democracy. We rebel against any structure or arrangement not from Allah or His prophet.
We have adopted Allah’s structure, i.e. the Qur’an
and the Hadith on the path of Ahl- Sunna wal Jama’a. We rebel against the
Shia. We rebel against the Tatsine. We rebel against any labeling. You will not find us in [these labels of
groups]…But if you look for us in the Qur’an
and the Hadith, you will find us there by Allah’s special grace. [Imam Abubakar Shekau,
2010, VCD, Taqaddum, time code 23:53].
This declaration was followed by a
series of increased sniper attacks on security
forces (police stations, police and army check points), with increasing
use of both improvised explosive
devices (IED) and ready-made bombs often lobbed at security patrols
or remotely exploded
near security patrols.
Included in the violence were also targeted assignations of individuals
considered by the group to have either betrayed them or provided support to the security forces to prosecute
them. The sum of all these was to
create a climate of fear in Maiduguri, which later spread to Bauchi; so much that the mere mention of a possible
visit to a State by the group was enough to
send fears of trepidation—despite the group’s repeated insistence that
they do not target civilians whom they do not consider
in the enemy camp.
However, their most visible
presence—bringing them into the Islamist militia’s ‘big league’— came in two spectacular suicide bombings—introducing a first in Nigerian militancy. The first occurred
on Thursday 16th June 2011 in which a suicide
bomber and a member of the
group, Alhaji Mohammed Manga, detonated explosives packed in his car in the vicinity of the headquarters of the Nigerian
police force in Abuja [the capital],
killing five people, including himself. In a recorded telephone interview to journalists (Salkida 2011a), the group’s spokesman Abu Zaid explained:
Although
the Force headquarters was among the list of our targets, we made it a priority
and acted quickly because of the
empty threats of the Inspector-General of Police that he would eradicate us within two weeks… we planned
it as a suicide attack right from the onset. The attacker left his will to his family and a message to Nigerians.
We were together and he bid everyone
farewell. He was calm and looked peaceful even when he had decided to give his life away; many brothers envied him and
wished it was their turn to act. The bomber said he had sacrificed his life for Allah’s sake and urged other
believers to do likewise. So far, we have screened
nearly 100 persons
for suicide attacks
for this year alone in Nigeria, while
more than this number are getting ready for next year.
In this singular act JASLWJ proved
their determination to make their points across. However, more was to come. On Monday 15th August 2011 a member
of the JASLWJ, Abu Mohammed, drove a
car packed with explosives into a compound during police
cadet officers screening
exercise. When he failed to obey commands
to
stop, the security forces shot and
killed him, preventing him from exploding the car and killing the cadet officers
(Mbaya and Abimaje
2011).
On Friday 26th August 2011, Muhammad
Abul Burra, a member of the JASLWJ drove a car at a high speed laden with explosives and rammed it into the ground floor of
the United Nations headquarters in Abuja, killing 23 people, including himself.
In another telephone interview with
the reporter Salkida of Blueprint newspaper,
the deputy spokesperson of the group, Abu Qaqa explained
that:
“Our relationship with Al Qaida is very strong. In fact, our leader (Shekau)
and his team were in Mecca for the lesser Hajj to
consolidate on that relationship. And we carried out the attack on the UN building when he was about to go into a meeting
with Al Qaida leadership in order to strengthen
our negotiation position.”
As
you can see, all over the world people have been talking, everyone has been
talking, even the Sultan of Sokoto
has sympathized with the victims. But where was the Sultan when soldiers entered mosques in Maiduguri and
stepped on the Holy Qur’an in Biu and killed a
little girl at Budum in Maiduguri? The Sultan didn’t come out to condemn
that attack as he condemned this because he was a soldier. Between
the UN and the mosque,
which is greater?…Of course, our objective is to place Nigeria in a difficult position and even to destabilize it and replace
it with Sharia. Whether we will conduct such Islamic government or not is a different issue.”
(Salkida 2011b).
He said the group intends to take
Nigeria back to the pre-colonial times when the Sharia law was practiced. It in this statement that the Islamist
agenda first appeared forcefully—to
ensure compliance with Shari’a in at least those Nigerian states that had re-implemented the Shari’a penal code since 1999.
Conclusion
It is clear that there
is a paradigm shift in Nigerian militant
Islamism in which at least
three distinct typologies evolved. The first was rhetorical clash between Sufi brotherhoods, although
there were occasional violent confrontations. The two opposing brotherhoods however, formed a
truce when the Wahabbist Izala group emerged,
leading to a second stage in Muslim radicalism in the country. This was because the Izala’s ultraorthodox
philosophy interpretation of Islam pitched them against the Sufi brotherhoods’ veneration of saints.
The third was the escalation of the
Nigerian economy, leading to a vast army of jobless youth that provided
a fodder for any revolutionary—which apparently happened in the case of the series of Maitatsine fundamentalist uprisings in the 1980s. The fourth, so far, was the emergence of Jama’atu Ahl-Sunnah Lidda’awati wal Jihad
(JASLWJ) as a group of initially rhetorical preachers, driven
underground by the Nigerian
security apparatus leading
to violent confrontations, and eventually, Islamist
agenda to ensure compliance with the Shari’a in an Islamicate society.
In my use of the term ‘Islamicate’ to
refer to northern Nigeria, I borrow Marshal Hodgson’s original conception of the word who created
it in the following argument:
…if
the analogy with 'Christendom' is held to, 'Islamdom' does not designate in
itself a 'civilization', a specific
culture, but only the society that carries that culture. There has been, however, a culture, centred on a lettered tradition, which has been
historically distinctive of Islamdom
the society, and which has been
naturally shared in by both Muslims and non-
Muslims who participate at all fully in the society of Islamdom. For
this, I have used the adjective 'Islamicate'. I thus restrict the term 'Islam' to the religion of the Muslims,
not using
that
term for the far more general phenomena, the society of Islamdom and its
Islamicate cultural traditions…'Islamicate' would refer not directly to the religion, Islam, itself, but to the social
and cultural complex historically associated with Islam and the Muslims, both
among Muslims themselves and even when found among non-Muslims. (Hodgson 1977:58-59 including
emphasis).
With this extended conception, I argue
that JASLWJ emerged out of discontentment with
both social and political structures of an Islamicate social culture of
northern Nigeria, framed against the background of American War on Terrorism
which portrayed United
States – consequently the amorphous “West” – as undesirable to Muslim social culture. This was backed by
the rhetoric of international radical scholars—whose lectures are readily available on the Internet
via download sites such as YouTube—such as Al-Faisal. JASLWJ adherents sought to substitute the Islamicate social
structure with what they perceived to be a more Islamic structure – following antecedent Kharijites—another term they abhor when labeled
against them, since in their philosophy, Nigerian
government is not Muslim, and the original Kharijites opposed
a Muslim government—in their adoption of any means necessary to bring about violent change; violence
which has ricochet effects not only on the instruments
of the State, but also at followers of their faith. In this course of action, their ready template seemed to be the
Taliban of Afghanistan, the Al-Shabab of Somalia, and the Armed
Islamic Group (GIA,
Groupe Islamique Armé] of Algeria.
The emergence of JASLWJ in northern Nigeria
signals a paradigm
shift in the growth of Islamic militant tendencies in
northern Nigeria – a shift that seems to be in line with a new age and often designer
destructive tendencies of transnational dimensions and antecedents. There was indeed a remarkable transformation
in the nature of the membership of such emergent
militant Islamists.
This is because the emergence of ‘Yan
Tatsine in the 1980s was situated within African
postcolonial labor theories and often Marxist frameworks (e.g. Bashir 1983, Lubeck,
1985). Followers of the militant
Islamist group were seen as disenfranchised unlettered urban poor who were
intimidated by their poverty and lack of access to quality life in the city dwellings they found themselves, especially after rainy seasons are over in the rural areas and they
migrated to town to survive as urchins and city debris.
I argue that application of this
particular strand of Marxist theory does not, however, explain the subsequent emergence of the urban guerilla
sniper tactics of JASLWJ who had access to technology, skills, training and transnational networks
of fellow militant
Islamists from where
they leant the tactics of urban guerrilla warfare.
The American military campaigns in Iraq
(Operation Desert Storm, 2 August 1990 – 28
February 1991) and (War on Terrorism, 2001) following the September 2001 terrorist attacks on US soil did not
create militant sympathies with Al Qaeda, the
alleged perpetuators of the attacks.
Protests against the attacks, as well as sympathies with Osama bin Laden are reflected in
streets protests or in the private sphere of the home, e.g. naming newly born babies ‘Osama’ in honor Osama bin
Laden); but for the most part protests
remained street affairs
attracting large number of urban
youth in Ibadan, Kano, Kaduna and other areas,
rather than systematic allegiance with Al Qaeda or its methodologies. The emergence of JASLWJ seemed
set to change all that and create
a link between Islamist militants
in northern Nigeria
and Al Qaeda cells.
Two incidents illustrate this possible
convergence. First was the attempted bombing
of a Northwest Airlines Flight 253on its landing approach
to Detroit on 25th December 2009 by a Nigerian man, Umar
Faruk AbdulMutallab. The fact that AbdulMutallab, only 23 years (and in Nigerian tradition, a little more than a “child”) and son
of an extremely wealthy Nigerian banker, and who lived a privileged existence all his life with studies
outside Nigeria, including an engineering degree in the UK, and travels around the world could allegedly be
recruited by Al Qaeda militant
network refutes the labor and Marxist theories of the northern Nigerian Islamist militancy; for in a single day,
AbdulMutallab was able to indicate a more destructive influence than what JASLWJ and ‘Yan Tatsine could have achieved.
The second incident appeared out of a
more bloody, but non-Islamist incidence. On 19th
January 2010 violent riots erupted in Jos, in the Middle Belt section of
Nigeria. From all accounts of the riots, it would appear to have been on matters
of territoriality, with one
group claiming ownership of the land (ethnic Berom) and insisting that others (especially Muslim Hausa) were settlers
and have no right to occupancy (for a
historical treatment of the problem see, for example, Je’adayibe 2006, Muhammed and Adeoye 2006).
Immediately after this,
Al Qaeda North Africa issued an open invitation to Muslims in
Nigeria for training and ammunition so that they
can “fight their enemies”. This was followed at one stage by the picture of Muhammad
Yusuf on one of Al Qaeda’s websites, celebrating his martyrdom.
From all indications, JASLWJ, like many
other religious extremist groups is not out to
commit robbery, rape, or other such materialistic or non-ideologically
motivated crimes. Members are usually
morally upright people of integrity with alternative interpretations about important issues in Islam, but who are
convinced that they are absolutely right and should
be left alone to preach
their religion.
When
the violence started
escalating in northern
Nigeria, the Federal
Government set up a Presidential Committee on Security
Challenges in the Northeast Zone under the
chairmanship of Ambassador Galtimari committee in August
2011 to explore
possible ways of dialogue
with the group. In a swift reaction, the group’s spokesman, Abul Qaqa sent an email response
to various newspapers in Nigeria, stating,
in part:
Nobody
was willing to address the fundamental issues we raised and therefore, those
that made the recommendations are on
their own…We did not recommend the setting up of any committee under whatever name or guise. We do not recognize the
Sultan of Sokoto as the leader of the
Muslims…what we are saying is that we want a Shari’a State that will ensure equity,
justice and the fear of God. (Idris,
2011:2).
Consequently, their actions and motivations come from their faith-based ideology
and interpretation of
Islamic religious texts. An ongoing intellectual and ideological engagement with such extremists by Muslim
activists, ‘former fanatics’ and the scholars
they respect can dissuade those who are prone to violence as a way of furthering their religious interests. The
biggest challenge is finding the appropriate
entry point to such engagement. The rationales for religious violence
therefore cannot be addressed effectively by the existing
law-enforcement agencies, because
reducing such extremism
requires advocating a more balanced ideological discourse from within
the framework of Islam.
According to DCCN (2009) to be
credible, such advocacy must be faith-based and involve distinguished Muslim scholars who have the patience to
deeply understand their particular
extremist positions, who can quote extensively from well-respected traditional authorities, and who can
respect the bridge-building Ethics and Etiquettes of Disagreement in Islam (Adab
al-Ikhtilaf). As a rule, such extremist groups also have very little knowledge and appreciation of fields such as
the Principles and Methodology of Islamic
Jurisprudence (Usul ul-Fiqh) and of
the Higher Objectives and Intents
of Islamic Law (Maqasid al-Shari’ah).
Without such an intellectual and
ideological engagement with such extremists (even though sincere), the use of brutal force can only temporarily
silence or frustrate such groups—as
indeed the emergence of JASLWJ as a militia army shows. Force often makes them become
more fanatical and go underground where they are more difficult to monitor and engage—as the case of the GIA in Algeria
clearly demonstrates. With the
response of the Nigerian authorities to the JASLWJ being violent, a window of opportunity has now been created for the escalation of that violence
through transnational channels
that are far more deadly, and with far-reaching consequences, than
videotaped rhetoric and debates.
Notes
1.
By ‘orthodox Islam’ I refer to conventional
traditional Sunni Islam, and thus exclude any
debate on Shi’ite Islam in northern Nigeria. This is because the radical
militancy alluded to in this paper was contextualized within Sunni Islam.
2.
This was www.mansoorah.net, and which contained a pdf
file of one of the member’s papers. The site was down as of August 2011. However, they opened a blog at http://yusufislamicbrothers.blogspot.com/ which made
it clear that they were aware of the debates about
them on the Internet, including Facebook.
3.
Based on undocumented accounts by informants in
Maiduguri who were close to the group at its peak.
4.
The quoted debates from the Pantami Debate were in
Hausa language. The translations are mine.
5.
The actual word “Geology” was also used in this narrative by Muhammad Yusuf.
6.
al-Furqan
baina Awliya al-Rahman wa-Awliya al- Shaitan [The Decisive Criterion
between the Allies of the Merciful
and the Allies of the Devil].
7.
In this Hausa explanation, Muhammad
Yusuf used the actual expression, “theory of revolution” in English – indicating his
familiarity with it, although not understanding; for in one scene they were debating the Darwinian theory of evolution,
and in the next they were discussing planetary revolutions.
8.
I would like to thank Mu’allim Abdalla Sani ibn
Shu’aibu of Dandago, Kano city who helped in
translating the original passages into Hausa, from which I further translated
into English. I also acknowledge the
invaluable assistance of Adamun Adamawa of Bauchi who graciously lent a copy of
the original Yusuf’s book for scanning.
9.
As is the case with all his public speeches and
debates, this was in the Hausa language. The
translations are mine.
10.
Using the dating stamped on the files in the CD, since
the was nowhere in the debate where the date of the debate was recorded, as in the Pantami Debate.
11.
These attacks were fully chronicled by Maje El-Hajeej,
an investigative reporter for Hausa Leadership in the edition
of the newspaper dated 30th June 2011,
pp. 4-5, 20.
Sources and Filmography
At
least five video recordings were available in northern Nigerian markets and
traffic light DVD vendors that
capture three of the main manifestos of JASLWJ. In addition, there are claimed
to be many books written in Arabic by the late leader of the group, Muhammad Yusuf;
although these do not seem to be widely available. The most
recent was Hazihi Akeedatum wa Minhaju
Da’awatuna (This is Our Manifesto and Our Path, Yusuf 2009).
The
first is what I call the Pantami Debate. This was a muqabala (debate) between Malam Isa Aliyu Ibrahim Pantami, the Chief Imam of the Abubakar Tafawa Balewa
University of Technology, Bauchi, and Muhammad
Yusuf, who accepted
to the debate on a special invitation. The debate took place on 29 Jumadal
Ula 1427 (Sunday
25th June 2006)
in Bauchi and sold only within the shops/mosques of Boko Haram. After the outbreak of hostilities
between Boko Haram and the Nigerian Police Force in 2009 which eventually lead to the death of their leader, Muhammad
Yusuf, the Pantami Debate surfaced at various
markets in Kano. The debates lasts for 2:48:15 hours, and was produced by
CDWEB/Darul Islam, Bauchi (no address
listed). The full title of the DVD is Muqabala
Kan Matsayin Karatun Boko da Aikin Gwamnati a Najeriya (Debate on the Status of Western
Education and Government Employment in Nigeria), although the cover the DVD carries a
different title which nevertheless conveyed
the content. This was Takaddama – Boko A
Musulunci: Halal ko Haram (Debate – Western Education in Islam: Forbidden or Acceptable?). Although the
Pantami Debate lasted for over 2:48 minutes, the first 30 minutes were spent by the two scholars setting
the scene and establishing the rules of engagement. The actual debate started
at the 31st minute, and it is from the transcript of this that I extracted
the section of this paper that deals
with the epistemology of Boko Haram.
The second
was debate by Boko Haram
Musabaka No 2, which I call the Democracy Debate,
with Idris Abdul'Aziz, also Bauchi as the Pantami
Debate, and recorded early February 2008, but produced 26th February
2008.8 It was marketed by Al-Kitab Wassunah
Cassette, Islamic Propagation Center, Jos, and titled
“Muqabala kan Karatun Boko da Aikin Gwamnati a Najeriya” VCD 3 (Debate on
Western Education and Civil Service
Employment in Nigeria). Although it was labeled VCD 3 (indicating it is part of a series), there was no listing at
the beginning or at the rather abrupt ending of the video of the others
in the series. However, a similar CD was also issued by Darul Islam, Bauchi.
The two main issues discussed in debate were general education
(especially university level) democracy, constitution and their viability
in Islam. This debate was more heated
and rowdy, with each of the debaters trying to get a point
across, and being interrupted by the other – so much that it is often difficult to discern when a particular
point is exhausted. Yet throughout, they both remained almost cheerful towards each other, and the
feeling conveyed was that of two people who agree to disagree on certain
issues.
The third video
from Muhammad Yusuf recorded a single sermon that led to
the bloody events of July 2009 which lead to his own death. It was recorded
on Thursday 11 June 2009 (from the opening statement made by Muhammad
Yusuf himself). It was titled “Budaddiyar Wasika
Zuwa ga Gwamnatin
Tarayyar Najeriya” [Open Letter to the Government of the Federal
Republic of Nigeria].
The video lasts
for 1.16.08 hours, and was marketed by Khairul Huda, Maiduguri, Borno State, Nigeria.
Following the death
of Muhammad Yusuf,
the video became widely available
via mobile phone networks. It was the final testament
of a revolutionary and provided
the template for the Islamist
violence that was follow from January 2010 in northern
Nigeria. Over videos
were not so widely publicized, but often sent to newspaper
journalists (particularly Blueprint,
Abuja) who subsequently make them available to the public. The Internet video sharing
site, YouTube also has many clips of the group (http://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=boko+haram&suggested_categories=25%2C22%2C28 &page=3) – although their authenticity cannot
be verified.
The
fourth video was titled Gazwatu Abi
Ibrahim [Abi Ibrahim’s War], and released by the Public Affairs unit of the JASLWJ. It details the
attack on Bauchi prison in September 2010. However, more than that, it show a young militia member, Abi Ibrahim,
explaining how he strategically planned the attack with Google map – indicating clearly that not all ‘boko’ is haram.
The
fifth and final video, titled Taqaddum [Presentation]
was a speech by Abubakar Shekau, who took over
the leadership of JASLWJ after the death of Muhammad Yusuf. Released in
December 2010, it had a mastering time code of December 20, 2010. In the speech,
the group openly
declared further their
manifesto and what they stood
for—including a ‘no retreat, no surrender’ reaffirmation of their right to practice their religion without
fear or molestation from Nigerian
security forces.
References
Adesoji, Abimbola.
2010. ‘The Boko Haram Uprising
and Islamic Revivalism in Nigeria.’ Africa Spectrum, 45 (2), 95-108.
Ali, Yusuf. 1935.
The Holy Qur’an.
Translation and Commentary. Jeddah: Dar Al Arabia Publications. Alkanawi, Abu Maryam Muhammad. 2008. Hidayat Talba Ilaa Hukminni raasa fil madarasil
mukhtalata wa dirasa mazariyya al kafaratil fajara [Enlightening students
about the ruling on teaching
in corrupted Western schools from the perspective of
unbelievers]. Maiduguri:
Dutsen Karya Advertising.
Ayoob, Mohammed.
2008. The Many Faces of Political
Islam – Religion and Politics in the Muslim World. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
Baldwin, T. H. 1932. The Obligation of Princes. Beirut:
Imprimerie Catholique.
Bargery, G. P. 1934. A Hausa-English Dictionary and English-Hausa Vocabulary. Second Edition.
1993. Zaria: All Nigeria Foundation/Ahmadu Bello University Press.
Barkindo, Bawuro M. 1988. ‘The Role of al-Maghili in the
Reforms of Sarki Muhammadu Rumfa (1463-1499) of Kano: A re-examination’ Kano Studies New Series Vol 3 No 1,
1987/88, 85- 110
Bashir, Ibrahim L. 1983. ‘Classism Conflict and
Socio-Economic Transition in a Changing Society: A Case of Kano's Oligarchy’, University of Sokoto History
Seminar, April, 1983.
BBC News. 2007. Profile: Sheikh Abdullah al-Faisal. Available online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6692243.stm,
last accessed 7th October 2011.
Black, Antony. 2011. The
History of Islamic Political Thought - From the Prophet to the Present, Second
Edition. Edinburgh. The University Press.
Brunnow, Rudolf Ernst. 1884. Die Charidschiten unter den ersten
Omayyaden. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
Center for the Study of Nigerian Languages (CSNL). 2006.
Kamusun Hausa na Jami’ar Bayero [Bayero University Hausa Dictionary]. Kano: Bayero University, Kano [Nigeria].
Chamberlain, J.W. 1975.The
Development of Islamic Education in Kano City, Nigeria, with emphasis on Legal Education in the 19th and 20th
Centuries. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Columbia University, 1975. .
Christelow, Alan. 1985. ‘The ‘Yan Tatsine Disturbances in
Kano: a search for perspective’, The Muslim
World, 75 (1985),
pp. 69-84.
Christelow, Allan. 1985. ‘Religious Protest
and Dissent in Northern Nigeria:
From Mahdism to Qur’anic Integralism’. Journal Institute of Muslim Minority
Affairs 6 (1985):
375–393.
Clark, Peter. 1987 ‘The Maitatsine Movement in Northern
Nigeria in Historical and Current Perspective, in Rosalind I. J. Hackett
(ed.) New Religious Movements in Nigeria,
African Studies Volume
5. New York: The Edwin Mellen Press,
pp. 93-115.
Da’awah Co-ordination Council of Nigeria (DCCN). 2009. The
“Boko Haram” Tragedy: Frequently Asked Questions. Minna, Niger State,
Nigeria: DCCN Publications.
Demant,
Peter R. 2006. Islam vs. Islamism: The Dilemma of the Muslim World. London:
Praeger. East, Rupert A. 1932. Hausawa Da Makwabtansu Vols I and II (being Hausa translations of Kano
Chronicle by Palmer (1908).
Zaria: Gaskiya Corporation.
Gwarzo, Hassan I. 1972. The
life and teaching of Al-Maghili with particular reference to Saharan Jewish community, Unpublished PhD thesis, University of London.
Hajeej, Maje El. 2011. News report feature: ‘Boko Haram:
Shekaranjiya, Jiya, Yau da kuma Gobe’ [Boko Haram:
Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow]. Leadership Hausa, Abuja, Nigeria,
June 30, 2011,
pp. 4-5, 20.
Hiskett, Mervyn. 1975. A
History of Hausa Islamic Verse. London. School of Oriental and African Studies.
Hiskett, Mervyn. 1987. ‘The Maitatsine Riots in Kano, 1980:
an assessment,’ Journal of Religion in Africa, 17 (1987), pp. 209-223.
Hodgson, Marshall G. S. 1977. The Venture of Islam, Volume 1: The Classical Age of Islam.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hollander,
Paul. ed. 2008. Political Violence:
Belief, Behavior, and Legitimation. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.
Idris, Hamza.
2011. News report byline: ‘FG’s Committee Never Addressed Out Demands – Boko Haram.’
Daily Trust (Abuja, Nigeria), Thursday September 29, 2011, p. 2.
Idris, Hamza.
2011. News report
byline: ‘FG’s committee
never addressed our demands – Boko Haram.’
Daily Trust, Thursday, 29 September 2011, p. 2.
Isichei, Elizabeth. 1987. ‘The Maitatsine Risings in Nigeria,
1980-1985: a revolt of the disinherited’,
Journal of Religion in Africa, 17 (1987), pp. 194-208.
Jalo, Ibrahim Muhammad. 2009. Ittihalful alhbaitil amjad bi bayani khada’i man harramat tawazzufi tahtal hukumatil kama’imati fil bilad [Enlightening
respected audience on the mistakes of he who forbids
government employment]. Jos: Ibzar Publishing Company.
Je’adayibe, Gwamna Dogara.
2006. ‘Religion and Ethnic Relations
in the Middle-Belt Area of Nigeria’,
in Akinwumi, Olayeni; Okpeh, Ochayi Okpeh, Jr; and Gwamna, Je’adayibe Dogara (eds), Inter-Group
Relations in Nigeria During the 19th and 20th Centuries.. Makurdi: Aboki Publishers, 588-604.
Kane, Ousmane. 2003. Muslim
Modernity in Postcolonial Nigeria: A study of the Society for the Removal
of Innovation and Reinstatement of Tradition. Leiden;
Boston: Brill.
Kastfelt, Niels.
1989. ‘Rumours of Maitatsine: A Note on Political Culture
in Northern Nigeria’,
African Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 350. (Jan.,
1989), 83-90.
Kenney, Jeffrey T. 2006. Muslim
Rebels: Kharijites and the Politics of Extremism in Egypt. Oxford, New York: Oxford
University Press.
Larkin, Brian. 2004. ‘Bandiri Music, Globalization and Urban
Experience in Nigeria’, Social Text 81, Vol. 22, No. 4, Winter
2004, 91-112.
Last, Murray. 1983. ‘Kano: c.1450-1800,’ Studies in the History of Kano, edited by Bawuro M. Barkindo.
Kano: Bayero University Kano, Dept of History/Oxford University Press.
Lavers, John E. 1984. ‘Popular Islam and Unpopular Dissent:
religious disturbances in Northern Nigeria’,
paper presented at the Conference on Popular Islam in the Twenties Century
Africa, University of Illinois/Program of African Studies,
Urbana, April 1984.
Lubeck, Paul M. 1985. ‘Islamic Protest under Semi-Industrial
Capitalism: 'Yan Tatsine Explained.’ Africa: Journal of the International African
Institute, Vol. 55, No. 4, Popular Islam (1985), 369-389.
Martin, Richard C. and Barzegar, Abbas. eds. 2010. Islamism: Contested Perspectives on
Political Islam. Stanford:
Stanford University Press.
Mbaya, Dauda and Abimaje, Achor.
2011. News report
byline: Boko Haram: Suicide Bomber
Killed In Maiduguri. Online at http://www.leadership.ng/nga/articles/3839/2011/08/16/boko_haram_suicide_bomber_killed_ maiduguri.html, last accessed October
5, 2011.
Mohammed,
A., and Khan, M. B., “From Cradle to Grave: The Contribution of Ulama to
Education in Nigeria.: Kano Studies
Vol 2 No 2,
1981, 110-145.
Muhammed, A.Y. and Adeoye, M. N. 2006. ‘Religious Violence in
Nigeria, 1980-1999: Implications for
Inter-Group Relations,’ Akinwumi, Olayeni; Okpeh, Ochayi Okpeh, Jr; and Gwamna, Je’adayibe Dogara (eds), Inter-Group Relations
in Nigeria During the 19th and 20th Centuries.. Makurdi:
Aboki Publishers, pp. 736-747.
Ogori, Abdulkareem. 2010. News report byline: ‘Return of the
Boko Haram.’ The Politico, [Abuja], Maiden edition, December
18, 2010, 11-16. Also available
online at http://the- politico.com/cover/return-of-the-boko-haram/, last accessed 18th September 2011.
Paden, John N. 2005. Muslim
Civic Cultures and Conflict Resolution: The Challenge of Democratic Federalism in Nigeria. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press
Palmer H. R. 1908. ‘The Kano Chronicle’ The Journal
of the Royal Anthropological Institute
of Great Britain
and Ireland, Vol. 38. (Jan.-
Jun., 1908), 58-98.
Patel, Ismail Adam. 2007. ‘The Scales for Defining Islamic
Political Radicalism.’ In Islamic
Political Radicalism: A European
Perspective, ed Abbas, Tahir, pp. 42-53. Edinburg: The University Press.
Rubin, Barry. ed. 2003. Contemporary Islamist
Movements in the Middle East.
Albany: State University of New York Press.
Salhi, Hamoud. 2011. ‘Al Shabab.’ In The Sage Encyclopedia of Terrorism, Second Edition, ed.
Martin, Gus, pp. 37-38. Thousand Oaks,
Calif: SAGE Publications.
Salih, M. A. Mohamed. 2009. ‘Islamic Political Parties in
Secular South Africa. ‘In Interpreting Islamic
Political Parties, ed. Salih, M. A. Mohamed,
191-206. New York: Palmgrave MacMillan.
Salih, M.A. Mohamed and El-Tom, Abdullahi Osman. 2009.
Introduction. In Interpreting Islamic Political
Parties, ed. Salih,
M. A. Mohamed, pp. 1-27.
New York: Palmgrave
MacMillan.
Salkida, Ahmad. 2011a. News report byline: ‘Boko Haram: We have lined up over 100 militants for suicide bombings.’ Blueprint, June 26, 2011, Abuja, Nigeria. Online at http://blueprintng.com/index/2011/06/boko-haram-we-have-lined-up-over-100-militants-for- suicide-bombings/, last accessed October
5, 2011.
Salkida, Ahmad. 2011b. News report byline: ‘Face of UN House
bomber’ Blueprint, September 2011, Abuja, Nigeria.
Online at http://blueprintng.com/index/2011/09/face-of-un-house-bomber/, last accessed October 5, 2011.
Skuratowicz, Katarzyana Z. 2004. Fundamentalist Religious
Movements: A Case Study of the Maitatsine Movement in Nigeria. M.A. thesis, University of Louisville.
Springer, Devin R., Regens, James L. and Edger, David
N. 2009. Islamic Radicalism and Global Jihad.
Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.
Starrat, Priscilla Ellen. 1993. Oral History in Muslim Africa: Al-Maghili Legends in Kano. PhD dissertation, The University of Michigan.
Vertigans, Stephen. 2009. Militant Islam: A Sociology of Characteristics, Causes and Consequences.
New York: Routledge.
Volpi, Frédéric. 2003. Islam and Democracy: The Failure of
Political Dialogue in Algeria. London: Pluto Press.
Wellhausen, Julius. 1901. The Religio-Political Factions
in Early Islam, trans (1975). R. C. Ostle and
S. M. Walzer, ed. R. C. Ostle. New York: American
Elsevier, 1975.
Yusuf, Abu Yusuf Muhammad ibn. 2009. Hazihi Akeedatum wa Minhaju Da’awatuna [This is Our Manifesto and Our Advocacy]. Maiduguri
[Borno State]: Guraba’u Printing Press, 17 Jumada Aula 1430/10th May 2009].
0 Comments
ENGLISH: You are warmly invited to share your comments or ask questions regarding this post or related topics of interest. Your feedback serves as evidence of your appreciation for our hard work and ongoing efforts to sustain this extensive and informative blog. We value your input and engagement.
HAUSA: Kuna iya rubuto mana tsokaci ko tambayoyi a ƙasa. Tsokacinku game da abubuwan da muke ɗorawa shi zai tabbatar mana cewa mutane suna amfana da wannan ƙoƙari da muke yi na tattaro muku ɗimbin ilimummuka a wannan kafar intanet.